refactor: Represent route auth information in the type system

This commit is contained in:
Ginger
2026-05-26 13:28:23 -04:00
committed by Ellis Git
parent dabbdc7517
commit 74841b6711
78 changed files with 496 additions and 482 deletions
+13 -68
View File
@@ -6,17 +6,14 @@ use axum::{
extract::{FromRequest, Path, Query},
};
use conduwuit::{Error, Result, err};
use ruma::{
CanonicalJsonObject, DeviceId, OwnedDeviceId, OwnedServerName, OwnedUserId, ServerName,
UserId, api::IncomingRequest,
};
use ruma::{CanonicalJsonObject, api::IncomingRequest};
use serde::Deserialize;
use crate::{State, router::auth::CheckAuth, service::appservice::RegistrationInfo};
use crate::{State, router::auth::CheckAuth};
/// Query parameters needed to authenticate requests
#[derive(Deserialize)]
pub(super) struct AuthQueryParams {
pub(crate) struct AuthQueryParams {
pub(super) user_id: Option<String>,
/// Device ID for appservice device masquerading (MSC3202/MSC4190).
/// Can be provided as `device_id` or `org.matrix.msc3202.device_id`.
@@ -25,67 +22,22 @@ pub(super) struct AuthQueryParams {
}
/// Extractor for Ruma request structs
pub(crate) struct Args<T> {
pub(crate) struct Args<R: IncomingRequest<Authentication: CheckAuth> + Send + Sync + 'static> {
/// Request struct body
pub(crate) body: T,
pub(crate) body: R,
/// Federation server authentication: X-Matrix origin
/// None when not a federation server.
pub(crate) origin: Option<OwnedServerName>,
/// Local user authentication: user_id.
/// None when not an authenticated local user.
pub(crate) sender_user: Option<OwnedUserId>,
/// Local user authentication: device_id.
/// None when not an authenticated local user or no device.
pub(crate) sender_device: Option<OwnedDeviceId>,
/// Appservice authentication; registration info.
/// None when not an appservice.
pub(crate) appservice_info: Option<RegistrationInfo>,
/// Parsed JSON content.
/// None when body is not a valid string
/// Parsed JSON body. None when body is not JSON.
pub(crate) json_body: Option<CanonicalJsonObject>,
/// Identity of the requesting entity
pub(crate) identity: <R::Authentication as CheckAuth>::Identity,
}
impl<T> Args<T>
impl<R> Deref for Args<R>
where
T: IncomingRequest + Send + Sync + 'static,
R: IncomingRequest<Authentication: CheckAuth> + Send + Sync + 'static,
{
#[inline]
pub(crate) fn sender(&self) -> (&UserId, &DeviceId) {
(self.sender_user(), self.sender_device())
}
#[inline]
pub(crate) fn sender_user(&self) -> &UserId {
self.sender_user
.as_deref()
.expect("user must be authenticated for this handler")
}
#[inline]
pub(crate) fn sender_device(&self) -> &DeviceId {
self.sender_device
.as_deref()
.expect("user must be authenticated and device identified")
}
#[inline]
pub(crate) fn origin(&self) -> &ServerName {
self.origin
.as_deref()
.expect("server must be authenticated for this handler")
}
}
impl<T> Deref for Args<T>
where
T: IncomingRequest + Send + Sync + 'static,
{
type Target = T;
type Target = R;
fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { &self.body }
}
@@ -145,13 +97,6 @@ where
let body = R::try_from_http_request(request, &path)
.map_err(|e| err!(Request(BadJson(debug_warn!("{e}")))))?;
Ok(Self {
body,
origin: auth.origin,
sender_user: auth.sender_user,
sender_device: auth.sender_device,
appservice_info: auth.appservice_info,
json_body,
})
Ok(Self { body, json_body, identity: auth })
}
}
+136 -98
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ use std::any::{Any, TypeId};
use conduwuit::{Err, Result, err};
use ruma::{
OwnedDeviceId, OwnedServerName, OwnedUserId, UserId,
DeviceId, OwnedDeviceId, OwnedServerName, OwnedUserId, UserId,
api::{
IncomingRequest,
auth_scheme::{
@@ -20,20 +20,57 @@ use service::{
use crate::{router::args::AuthQueryParams, service::appservice::RegistrationInfo};
#[derive(Default)]
pub(super) struct Auth {
pub(super) origin: Option<OwnedServerName>,
pub(super) sender_user: Option<OwnedUserId>,
pub(super) sender_device: Option<OwnedDeviceId>,
pub(super) appservice_info: Option<RegistrationInfo>,
pub(crate) enum ClientIdentity {
User {
sender_user: OwnedUserId,
sender_device: OwnedDeviceId,
},
Appservice {
sender_user: OwnedUserId,
sender_device: Option<OwnedDeviceId>,
appservice_info: RegistrationInfo,
},
}
pub(super) trait CheckAuth: AuthScheme {
impl ClientIdentity {
pub(crate) fn sender_user(&self) -> &UserId {
match self {
| Self::User { sender_user, .. } | Self::Appservice { sender_user, .. } =>
sender_user,
}
}
pub(crate) fn sender_device(&self) -> Option<&DeviceId> {
match self {
| Self::User { sender_device, .. } => Some(sender_device),
| Self::Appservice { sender_device, .. } => sender_device.as_deref(),
}
}
pub(crate) fn expect_sender_device(&self) -> Result<&DeviceId> {
self.sender_device().ok_or_else(|| {
err!(Request(Forbidden("Appservices must masquerade to use this endpoint")))
})
}
pub(crate) fn appservice_info(&self) -> Option<&RegistrationInfo> {
match self {
| Self::User { .. } => None,
| Self::Appservice { appservice_info, .. } => Some(appservice_info),
}
}
pub(crate) fn is_appservice(&self) -> bool { matches!(self, Self::Appservice { .. }) }
}
pub(crate) trait CheckAuth: AuthScheme {
type Identity: Send;
fn authenticate<R: IncomingRequest + Any, B: AsRef<[u8]> + Sync>(
services: &Services,
incoming_request: &hyper::Request<B>,
query: AuthQueryParams,
) -> impl Future<Output = Result<Auth>> + Send {
) -> impl Future<Output = Result<Self::Identity>> + Send {
async move {
let route = TypeId::of::<R>();
@@ -54,17 +91,19 @@ pub(super) trait CheckAuth: AuthScheme {
request: &hyper::Request<B>,
query: AuthQueryParams,
route: TypeId,
) -> impl Future<Output = Result<Auth>> + Send;
) -> impl Future<Output = Result<Self::Identity>> + Send;
}
impl CheckAuth for ServerSignatures {
type Identity = OwnedServerName;
async fn verify<B: AsRef<[u8]> + Sync>(
services: &Services,
output: Self::Output,
request: &hyper::Request<B>,
_query: AuthQueryParams,
_route: TypeId,
) -> Result<Auth> {
) -> Result<Self::Identity> {
let destination = services.globals.server_name();
if output
.destination
@@ -96,10 +135,7 @@ impl CheckAuth for ServerSignatures {
)));
}
Ok(Auth {
origin: Some(output.origin.clone()),
..Default::default()
})
Ok(output.origin)
},
| Err(err) =>
Err!(Request(Unauthorized(warn!("Failed to verify X-Matrix header: {err}")))),
@@ -108,162 +144,164 @@ impl CheckAuth for ServerSignatures {
}
impl CheckAuth for AccessToken {
type Identity = ClientIdentity;
async fn verify<B: AsRef<[u8]> + Sync>(
services: &Services,
output: Self::Output,
_request: &hyper::Request<B>,
query: AuthQueryParams,
route: TypeId,
) -> Result<Auth> {
// Check for appservice tokens first
let (sender_user, sender_device, appservice_info) = {
if let Ok((sender_user, sender_device)) =
services.users.find_from_token(&output).await
) -> Result<Self::Identity> {
if let Ok((sender_user, sender_device)) = services.users.find_from_token(&output).await {
// Locked users can only use /logout and /logout/all
if services
.users
.is_locked(&sender_user)
.await
.is_ok_and(std::convert::identity)
{
// Locked users can only use /logout and /logout/all
if services
.users
.is_locked(&sender_user)
.await
.is_ok_and(std::convert::identity)
if !(route == TypeId::of::<client::session::logout::v3::Request>()
|| route == TypeId::of::<client::session::logout_all::v3::Request>())
{
if !(route == TypeId::of::<client::session::logout::v3::Request>()
|| route == TypeId::of::<client::session::logout_all::v3::Request>())
{
return Err!(Request(Unauthorized("Your account is locked.")));
}
return Err!(Request(Unauthorized("Your account is locked.")));
}
}
(Some(sender_user), Some(sender_device), None)
} else if let Ok(appservice_info) = services.appservice.find_from_token(&output).await
{
let Ok(sender_user) = query.user_id.clone().map_or_else(
|| {
UserId::parse_with_server_name(
appservice_info.registration.sender_localpart.as_str(),
services.globals.server_name(),
)
},
UserId::parse,
) else {
return Err!(Request(InvalidUsername("Username is invalid.")));
Ok(ClientIdentity::User { sender_user, sender_device })
} else if let Ok(appservice_info) = services.appservice.find_from_token(&output).await {
let Ok(sender_user) = query.user_id.clone().map_or_else(
|| {
UserId::parse_with_server_name(
appservice_info.registration.sender_localpart.as_str(),
services.globals.server_name(),
)
},
UserId::parse,
) else {
return Err!(Request(InvalidUsername("Username is invalid.")));
};
if !appservice_info.is_user_match(&sender_user) {
return Err!(Request(Exclusive("User is not in namespace.")));
}
// MSC3202/MSC4190: Handle device_id masquerading for appservices.
// The device_id can be provided via `device_id` or
// `org.matrix.msc3202.device_id` query parameter.
let sender_device =
if let Some(device_id) = query.device_id.as_deref().map(Into::into) {
// Verify the device exists for this user
if services
.users
.get_device_metadata(&sender_user, device_id)
.await
.is_err()
{
return Err!(Request(Forbidden(
"Device does not exist for user or appservice cannot masquerade as \
this device."
)));
}
Some(device_id.to_owned())
} else {
None
};
if !appservice_info.is_user_match(&sender_user) {
return Err!(Request(Exclusive("User is not in namespace.")));
}
// MSC3202/MSC4190: Handle device_id masquerading for appservices.
// The device_id can be provided via `device_id` or
// `org.matrix.msc3202.device_id` query parameter.
let sender_device =
if let Some(device_id) = query.device_id.as_deref().map(Into::into) {
// Verify the device exists for this user
if services
.users
.get_device_metadata(&sender_user, device_id)
.await
.is_err()
{
return Err!(Request(Forbidden(
"Device does not exist for user or appservice cannot masquerade \
as this device."
)));
}
Some(device_id.to_owned())
} else {
None
};
(Some(sender_user), sender_device, Some(appservice_info))
} else {
return Err!(Request(Unauthorized("Invalid access token.")));
}
};
Ok(Auth {
sender_user,
sender_device,
appservice_info,
..Default::default()
})
Ok(ClientIdentity::Appservice {
sender_user,
sender_device,
appservice_info,
})
} else {
return Err!(Request(Unauthorized("Invalid access token.")));
}
}
}
impl CheckAuth for AccessTokenOptional {
type Identity = Option<ClientIdentity>;
async fn verify<B: AsRef<[u8]> + Sync>(
services: &Services,
output: Self::Output,
request: &hyper::Request<B>,
query: AuthQueryParams,
route: TypeId,
) -> Result<Auth> {
) -> Result<Self::Identity> {
match output {
| Some(token) =>
<AccessToken as CheckAuth>::verify(services, token, request, query, route).await,
| None => Ok(Auth::default()),
<AccessToken as CheckAuth>::verify(services, token, request, query, route)
.await
.map(Some),
| None => Ok(None),
}
}
}
impl CheckAuth for AppserviceToken {
type Identity = RegistrationInfo;
async fn verify<B: AsRef<[u8]> + Sync>(
services: &Services,
output: Self::Output,
_request: &hyper::Request<B>,
_query: AuthQueryParams,
_route: TypeId,
) -> Result<Auth> {
) -> Result<Self::Identity> {
let Ok(appservice_info) = services.appservice.find_from_token(&output).await else {
return Err!(Request(Unauthorized("Invalid appservice token.")));
};
Ok(Auth {
appservice_info: Some(appservice_info),
..Default::default()
})
Ok(appservice_info)
}
}
impl CheckAuth for AppserviceTokenOptional {
type Identity = Option<RegistrationInfo>;
async fn verify<B: AsRef<[u8]> + Sync>(
services: &Services,
output: Self::Output,
request: &hyper::Request<B>,
query: AuthQueryParams,
route: TypeId,
) -> Result<Auth> {
) -> Result<Self::Identity> {
match output {
| Some(token) =>
<AppserviceToken as CheckAuth>::verify(services, token, request, query, route)
.await,
| None => Ok(Auth::default()),
.await
.map(Some),
| None => Ok(None),
}
}
}
impl CheckAuth for NoAuthentication {
type Identity = ();
async fn verify<B: AsRef<[u8]> + Sync>(
_services: &Services,
_output: Self::Output,
_request: &hyper::Request<B>,
_query: AuthQueryParams,
_route: TypeId,
) -> Result<Auth> {
Ok(Auth::default())
) -> Result<Self::Identity> {
Ok(())
}
}
impl CheckAuth for NoAccessToken {
type Identity = Option<ClientIdentity>;
async fn verify<B: AsRef<[u8]> + Sync>(
services: &Services,
_output: Self::Output,
request: &hyper::Request<B>,
query: AuthQueryParams,
route: TypeId,
) -> Result<Auth> {
) -> Result<Self::Identity> {
// We handle these the same as AccessTokenOptional
let token = AccessTokenOptional::extract_authentication(request).map_err(|err| {
err!(Request(Unauthorized(warn!("Failed to extract authorization: {}", err))))