chore: Reformat with latest nightly

This commit is contained in:
Ginger committed 2026-09-01 12:55:05 -04:00
1 parent 03d669594e
commit 9fbabe2210
113 files changed
+981 -831

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+8 -6
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@@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ pub fn memory_stats(opts: &str) -> Option<String> {
// Acquire the epoch; ensure latest stats are pulled in
acq_epoch().ok()?;
// SAFETY: calls malloc_stats_print() with our string instance which must remain
// in this frame. https://docs.rs/tikv-jemalloc-sys/latest/tikv_jemalloc_sys/fn.malloc_stats_print.html
// SAFETY: calls malloc_stats_print() with our string instance which must
// remain in this frame. https://docs.rs/tikv-jemalloc-sys/latest/tikv_jemalloc_sys/fn.malloc_stats_print.html
unsafe { ffi::malloc_stats_print(Some(malloc_stats_cb), opaque, opts_p) };
str.truncate(MAX_LENGTH);
@@ -227,7 +227,8 @@ pub mod this_thread {
cell.get_or_init(|| {
let ptr: *const u64 = super::get(&mallctl!(name)).expect("failed to obtain pointer");
// SAFETY: ptr points directly to the internal state of jemalloc for this thread
// SAFETY: ptr points directly to the internal state of jemalloc for
// this thread
unsafe { ptr.as_ref() }.expect("pointer must not be null")
})
}
@@ -291,7 +292,8 @@ pub fn is_phycpu_arena() -> bool { percpu_arenas().is_ok_and(is_equal_to!("phycp
pub fn percpu_arenas() -> Result<&'static str> {
let ptr = get::<*const c_char>(&mallctl!("opt.percpu_arena"))?;
//SAFETY: ptr points to a null-terminated string returned for opt.percpu_arena.
//SAFETY: ptr points to a null-terminated string returned for
// opt.percpu_arena.
let cstr = unsafe { CStr::from_ptr(ptr) };
cstr.to_str().map_err(Into::into)
}
@@ -370,8 +372,8 @@ where
}
fn key(name: &str) -> Result<Key> {
// tikv asserts the output buffer length is tight to the number of required mibs
// so we slice that down here.
// tikv asserts the output buffer length is tight to the number of required
// mibs so we slice that down here.
let segs = name.chars().filter(is_equal_to!(&'.')).count().try_add(1)?;
let name = self::name(name)?;
+2 -1
View File
@@ -122,7 +122,8 @@ pub fn check(config: &Config) -> Result {
));
}
// yeah, unless the user built a debug build hopefully for local testing only
// yeah, unless the user built a debug build hopefully for local testing
// only
if cfg!(not(debug_assertions)) && config.server_name == "your.server.name" {
return Err!(Config(
"server_name",
+19 -17
View File
@@ -47,8 +47,8 @@ impl Manager {
let new = Arc::into_raw(config);
let old = self.active.swap(new.cast_mut(), Ordering::AcqRel);
// SAFETY: The old active pointer was set using an Arc::into_raw(). We're
// obliged to reconstitute that into Arc otherwise it will leak.
// SAFETY: The old active pointer was set using an Arc::into_raw().
// We're obliged to reconstitute that into Arc otherwise it will leak.
Ok(unsafe { Arc::from_raw(old) })
}
@@ -68,17 +68,18 @@ impl Manager {
.as_ref()
.expect("handle was already cached for this thread");
// SAFETY: The caller should not hold multiple references at a time directly
// into Config, as a subsequent reference might invalidate the thread's cache
// causing another reference to dangle.
// SAFETY: The caller should not hold multiple references at a time
// directly into Config, as a subsequent reference might invalidate
// the thread's cache causing another reference to dangle.
//
// This is a highly unusual pattern as most config values are copied by value or
// used immediately without running overlap with another value. Even if it does
// actually occur somewhere, the window of danger is limited to the config being
// reloaded while the reference is held and another access is made by the same
// thread into a different config value. This is mitigated by creating a buffer
// of old configs rather than discarding at the earliest opportunity; the odds
// of this scenario are thus astronomical.
// This is a highly unusual pattern as most config values are copied by
// value or used immediately without running overlap with another
// value. Even if it does actually occur somewhere, the window of
// danger is limited to the config being reloaded while the reference
// is held and another access is made by the same thread into a
// different config value. This is mitigated by creating a buffer
// of old configs rather than discarding at the earliest opportunity;
// the odds of this scenario are thus astronomical.
unsafe { std::mem::transmute(config) }
}
}
@@ -87,8 +88,8 @@ impl Drop for Manager {
fn drop(&mut self) {
let config = self.active.swap(null_mut(), Ordering::AcqRel);
// SAFETY: The active pointer was set using an Arc::into_raw(). We're obliged to
// reconstitute that into Arc otherwise it will leak.
// SAFETY: The active pointer was set using an Arc::into_raw(). We're
// obliged to reconstitute that into Arc otherwise it will leak.
unsafe { Arc::from_raw(config) };
}
}
@@ -119,8 +120,9 @@ fn load_miss(
Arc::from_raw(config)
};
// SAFETY: See the note on the transmute above. The caller should not hold more
// than one reference at a time directly into Config, as the second access
// might invalidate the thread's cache, dangling the reference to the first.
// SAFETY: See the note on the transmute above. The caller should not hold
// more than one reference at a time directly into Config, as the second
// access might invalidate the thread's cache, dangling the reference to
// the first.
unsafe { std::mem::transmute(handle[index].insert(config)) }
}
+2 -1
View File
@@ -2862,7 +2862,8 @@ impl Config {
.extract::<Self>()
.map_err(|e| err!("There was a problem with your configuration file: {e}"))?;
// don't start if we're listening on both UNIX sockets and TCP at same time
// don't start if we're listening on both UNIX sockets and TCP at same
// time
check::is_dual_listening(raw_config)?;
Ok(config)
+3 -2
View File
@@ -221,8 +221,9 @@ impl<E: Event + Clone> TestStore<E> {
) -> Result<Vec<OwnedEventId>> {
let mut auth_chain_sets = vec![];
for ids in event_ids {
// TODO state store `auth_event_ids` returns self in the event ids list
// when an event returns `auth_event_ids` self is not contained
// TODO state store `auth_event_ids` returns self in the event ids
// list when an event returns `auth_event_ids` self is not
// contained
let chain = self
.auth_event_ids(room_id, ids)?
.into_iter()
+63 -53
View File
@@ -195,9 +195,11 @@ where
"auth_check beginning"
);
// [synapse] check that all the events are in the same room as `incoming_event`
// [synapse] check that all the events are in the same room as
// `incoming_event`
// [synapse] do_sig_check check the event has valid signatures for member events
// [synapse] do_sig_check check the event has valid signatures for member
// events
let sender = incoming_event.sender();
@@ -213,7 +215,8 @@ where
return Ok(false);
}
// If the domain of the room_id does not match the domain of the sender, reject
// If the domain of the room_id does not match the domain of the sender,
// reject
if incoming_event.room_id().is_some() {
let Some(room_id_server_name) = incoming_event.room_id().unwrap().server_name()
else {
@@ -230,7 +233,8 @@ where
}
}
// If content.room_version is present and is not a recognized version, reject
// If content.room_version is present and is not a recognized version,
// reject
let content: RoomCreateContentFields = from_json_str(incoming_event.content().get())?;
if content
.room_version
@@ -326,8 +330,8 @@ where
return Ok(false);
}
// If the create event is referenced in the event's auth events, and this is a
// v12 room, reject
// If the create event is referenced in the event's auth events, and this is
// a v12 room, reject
let claims_create_event = incoming_event
.auth_events()
.any(|id| id == room_create_event.event_id());
@@ -335,8 +339,8 @@ where
warn!("event incorrectly references m.room.create event in auth events");
return Ok(false);
} else if !(room_version.room_id_format == RoomIdFormatVersion::V2) && !claims_create_event {
// If the create event is not referenced in the event's auth events, and this is
// a v11 room, reject
// If the create event is not referenced in the event's auth events, and
// this is a v11 room, reject
warn!(
missing = %room_create_event.event_id(),
"event incorrectly did not reference an m.room.create in its auth events"
@@ -545,9 +549,9 @@ where
return Ok(true);
}
// If the event type's required power level is greater than the sender's power
// level, reject If the event has a state_key that starts with an @ and does
// not match the sender, reject.
// If the event type's required power level is greater than the sender's
// power level, reject If the event has a state_key that starts with an @
// and does not match the sender, reject.
if !can_send_event(incoming_event, power_levels_event.as_ref(), sender_power_level) {
warn!(
%sender,
@@ -590,13 +594,13 @@ where
debug!("m.room.power_levels event allowed");
}
// Room version 3: Redaction events are always accepted (provided the event is
// allowed by `events` and `events_default` in the power levels). However,
// servers should not apply or send redaction's to clients until both the
// redaction event and original event have been seen, and are valid. Servers
// should only apply redaction's to events where the sender's domains match, or
// the sender of the redaction has the appropriate permissions per the
// power levels.
// Room version 3: Redaction events are always accepted (provided the event
// is allowed by `events` and `events_default` in the power levels).
// However, servers should not apply or send redaction's to clients until
// both the redaction event and original event have been seen, and are
// valid. Servers should only apply redaction's to events where the
// sender's domains match, or the sender of the redaction has the
// appropriate permissions per the power levels.
if room_version.authorization.special_case_room_redaction
&& *incoming_event.event_type() == TimelineEventType::RoomRedaction
@@ -759,8 +763,8 @@ where
Ok(match target_membership {
| MembershipState::Join => {
trace!("starting target_membership=join check");
// 1. If the only previous event is an m.room.create and the state_key is the
// creator,
// 1. If the only previous event is an m.room.create and the
// state_key is the creator,
// allow
let mut prev_events = current_event.prev_events();
@@ -960,8 +964,8 @@ where
},
| MembershipState::Leave => {
if sender == target_user {
// If the sender matches state_key, allow if that user's current membership
// state is invite, join, or knock.
// If the sender matches state_key, allow if that user's current
// membership state is invite, join, or knock.
let allow = matches!(
target_user_current_membership,
MembershipState::Join | MembershipState::Invite | MembershipState::Knock
@@ -985,10 +989,11 @@ where
);
false
} else {
// If the target user's current membership state is ban, and the sender's power
// level is less than the ban level, reject. If the sender's power level is
// greater than or equal to the kick level, and the target user's power level is
// less than the sender's power level, allow.
// If the target user's current membership state is ban, and the
// sender's power level is less than the ban level, reject.
// If the sender's power level is greater than or equal to
// the kick level, and the target user's power level is less
// than the sender's power level, allow.
let cannot_unban = target_user_current_membership == MembershipState::Ban
&& sender_power < effective_power_levels.ban;
let can_kick =
@@ -1030,9 +1035,9 @@ where
);
false
} else {
// If the sender's power level is greater than or equal to the ban level, and
// the target user's power level is less than the sender's power level, allow.
// Otherwise, reject.
// If the sender's power level is greater than or equal to the
// ban level, and the target user's power level is less than
// the sender's power level, allow. Otherwise, reject.
let allow =
sender_power >= effective_power_levels.ban && target_power < sender_power;
if !allow {
@@ -1047,8 +1052,8 @@ where
allow
},
| MembershipState::Knock if room_version.authorization.knocking => {
// 1. If the `join_rule` is anything other than `knock` or `knock_restricted`,
// reject.
// 1. If the `join_rule` is anything other than `knock` or
// `knock_restricted`, reject.
if !matches!(join_rules, JoinRule::KnockRestricted(_) | JoinRule::Knock) {
warn!(
"Join rule is not set to knock or knock_restricted, knocking is not allowed"
@@ -1057,8 +1062,8 @@ where
} else if matches!(join_rules, JoinRule::KnockRestricted(_))
&& !room_version.authorization.knock_restricted_join_rule
{
// 2. If the `join_rule` is `knock_restricted`, but the room does not support
// `knock_restricted`, reject.
// 2. If the `join_rule` is `knock_restricted`, but the room
// does not support `knock_restricted`, reject.
warn!(
"Join rule is set to knock_restricted but room version does not support \
knock_restricted, knocking is not allowed"
@@ -1076,8 +1081,8 @@ where
sender_membership,
MembershipState::Ban | MembershipState::Invite | MembershipState::Join
) {
// 4. If the `sender`'s current membership is not `ban`, `invite`, or `join`,
// allow.
// 4. If the `sender`'s current membership is not `ban`,
// `invite`, or `join`, allow.
// 5. Otherwise, reject.
warn!(
?target_user_membership_event_id,
@@ -1170,16 +1175,17 @@ fn check_power_levels(
}
// - If any of the keys users_default, events_default, state_default, ban,
// redact, kick, or invite in content are present and not an integer, reject.
// - If either of the keys events or notifications in content are present and
// not a dictionary with values that are integers, reject.
// - If users key in content is not a dictionary with keys that are valid user
// IDs with values that are integers, reject.
// redact, kick, or invite in content are present and not an integer,
// reject.
// - If either of the keys events or notifications in content are present
// and not a dictionary with values that are integers, reject.
// - If users key in content is not a dictionary with keys that are valid
// user IDs with values that are integers, reject.
let user_content: RoomPowerLevelsEventContent =
deserialize_power_levels(power_event.content().get(), room_version)?;
// Validation of users is done in Ruma, synapse for loops validating user_ids
// and integers here
// Validation of users is done in Ruma, synapse for loops validating
// user_ids and integers here
debug!("validation of power event finished");
#[allow(clippy::manual_let_else)]
@@ -1214,8 +1220,8 @@ fn check_power_levels(
let old_state = &current_content;
let new_state = &user_content;
// synapse does not have to split up these checks since we can't combine UserIds
// and EventTypes we do 2 loops
// synapse does not have to split up these checks since we can't combine
// UserIds and EventTypes we do 2 loops
// UserId loop
for user in user_levels_to_check {
@@ -1229,7 +1235,8 @@ fn check_power_levels(
continue;
}
// If the current value is equal to the sender's current power level, reject
// If the current value is equal to the sender's current power level,
// reject
if user != power_event.sender()
&& old_level.map(|i| UserPowerLevel::Int(*i)) == Some(user_level)
{
@@ -1244,8 +1251,9 @@ fn check_power_levels(
return Some(false); // cannot remove ops level == to own
}
// If the current value is higher than the sender's current power level, reject
// If the new value is higher than the sender's current power level, reject
// If the current value is higher than the sender's current power level,
// reject If the new value is higher than the sender's current power
// level, reject
let old_level_too_big = old_level.map(|i| UserPowerLevel::Int(*i)) > Some(user_level);
let new_level_too_big = new_level.map(|i| UserPowerLevel::Int(*i)) > Some(user_level);
if old_level_too_big {
@@ -1280,8 +1288,9 @@ fn check_power_levels(
continue;
}
// If the current value is higher than the sender's current power level, reject
// If the new value is higher than the sender's current power level, reject
// If the current value is higher than the sender's current power level,
// reject If the new value is higher than the sender's current power
// level, reject
let old_level_too_big = old_level.map(|i| UserPowerLevel::Int(*i)) > Some(user_level);
let new_level_too_big = new_level.map(|i| UserPowerLevel::Int(*i)) > Some(user_level);
if old_level_too_big {
@@ -1313,8 +1322,9 @@ fn check_power_levels(
let old_level = old_state.notifications.room;
let new_level = new_state.notifications.room;
if old_level != new_level {
// If the current value is higher than the sender's current power level, reject
// If the new value is higher than the sender's current power level, reject
// If the current value is higher than the sender's current power
// level, reject If the new value is higher than the sender's
// current power level, reject
let old_level_too_big = old_level > user_level;
let new_level_too_big = new_level > user_level;
if old_level_too_big || new_level_too_big {
@@ -1388,8 +1398,8 @@ fn check_redaction(
return Ok(true);
}
// If the domain of the event_id of the event being redacted is the same as the
// domain of the event_id of the m.room.redaction, allow
// If the domain of the event_id of the event being redacted is the same as
// the domain of the event_id of the m.room.redaction, allow
if redaction_event.event_id().server_name()
== redaction_event
.redacts()
+27 -23
View File
@@ -142,8 +142,8 @@ where
// We used to check that all events are events from the correct room
// this is now a check the caller of `resolve` must make.
// Get only the control events with a state_key: "" or ban/kick event (sender !=
// state_key)
// Get only the control events with a state_key: "" or ban/kick event
// (sender != state_key)
let control_events: Vec<_> = all_conflicted
.iter()
.stream()
@@ -187,8 +187,8 @@ where
debug!(count = deduped_power_ev.len(), "deduped power events");
trace!(set = ?deduped_power_ev, "deduped power events");
// This removes the control events that passed auth and more importantly those
// that failed auth
// This removes the control events that passed auth and more importantly
// those that failed auth
let events_to_resolve: Vec<_> = all_conflicted
.iter()
.filter(|&id| !deduped_power_ev.contains(id))
@@ -490,8 +490,8 @@ where
for (node, edges) in graph {
if edges.is_empty() {
let (power_level, origin_server_ts) = key_fn(node.clone()).await?;
// The `Reverse` is because rusts `BinaryHeap` sorts largest -> smallest we need
// smallest -> largest
// The `Reverse` is because rusts `BinaryHeap` sorts largest ->
// smallest we need smallest -> largest
zero_outdegree.push(Reverse(TieBreaker {
power_level,
origin_server_ts,
@@ -507,7 +507,8 @@ where
let mut heap = BinaryHeap::from(zero_outdegree);
// We remove the oldest node (most incoming edges) and check against all other
// We remove the oldest node (most incoming edges) and check against all
// other
let mut sorted = vec![];
// Destructure the `Reverse` and take the smallest `node` each time
while let Some(Reverse(item)) = heap.pop() {
@@ -574,8 +575,8 @@ where
let sender_is_creator =
sender_is_creator(&event, room_version, &auth_events, fetch_event).await?;
// Since v12 the room creators outrank any m.room.power_levels event, so their
// ordering position does not depend on one being in scope.
// Since v12 the room creators outrank any m.room.power_levels event, so
// their ordering position does not depend on one being in scope.
if sender_is_creator
&& room_version
.authorization
@@ -628,8 +629,8 @@ where
.find(|aev| is_type_and_key(*aev, &TimelineEventType::RoomCreate, ""))
.cloned();
// Since v12 the create event is no longer listed in auth_events; the room ID
// is its event ID.
// Since v12 the create event is no longer listed in auth_events; the room
// ID is its event ID.
let create_event = match create_event {
| Some(create_event) => Some(create_event),
| None =>
@@ -738,10 +739,11 @@ where
trace!(map = ?auth_events.keys().collect::<Vec<_>>(), "fetched auth events");
let auth_events = &auth_events;
// NOTE: in state resolution v2.1, auth checks should start with an empty state
// map. It is the caller's job to do this. Previously, this function would
// force an empty state map in this case, and this resulted in power events
// going missing from the resolved state as they'd be discarded here.
// NOTE: in state resolution v2.1, auth checks should start with an empty
// state map. It is the caller's job to do this. Previously, this function
// would force an empty state map in this case, and this resulted in power
// events going missing from the resolved state as they'd be discarded
// here.
let mut resolved_state = unconflicted_state;
for event in events_to_check {
trace!(event_id = event.event_id().as_str(), "checking event");
@@ -774,8 +776,8 @@ where
}
for aid in event.auth_events() {
if let Some(ev) = auth_events.get(aid) {
//TODO: synapse checks "rejected_reason" which is most likely related to
// soft-failing
//TODO: synapse checks "rejected_reason" which is most likely
// related to soft-failing
trace!(event_id = aid.as_str(), "found auth event");
auth_state.insert(
ev.event_type()
@@ -809,8 +811,8 @@ where
debug!(event_id = event.event_id().as_str(), "Running auth checks");
// The key for this is (eventType + a state_key of the signed token not sender)
// so search for it
// The key for this is (eventType + a state_key of the signed token not
// sender) so search for it
let current_third_party = auth_state.iter().find_map(|(_, pdu)| {
(*pdu.event_type() == TimelineEventType::RoomThirdPartyInvite).then_some(pdu)
});
@@ -848,7 +850,8 @@ where
trace!(map = ?resolved_state, "new resolved state");
},
| Ok(false) => {
// synapse passes here on AuthError. We do not add this event to resolved_state.
// synapse passes here on AuthError. We do not add this event to
// resolved_state.
warn!("event {} failed the authentication check", event.event_id());
},
| Err(e) => {
@@ -1276,8 +1279,8 @@ mod tests {
// #[tokio::test]
async fn test_sort() {
for _ in 0..20 {
// since we shuffle the eventIds before we sort them introducing randomness
// seems like we should test this a few times
// since we shuffle the eventIds before we sort them introducing
// randomness seems like we should test this a few times
test_event_sort().await;
}
}
@@ -1917,7 +1920,8 @@ mod tests {
.iter(),
);
// HashMap iteration order is random, so sort this before asserting on it
// HashMap iteration order is random, so sort this before asserting on
// it
for v in conflicted.values_mut() {
v.sort_unstable();
}
+5 -4
View File
@@ -86,8 +86,8 @@ pub(crate) async fn do_check(
// event_id -> StateMap<OwnedEventId>
let mut state_at_event: HashMap<OwnedEventId, StateMap<OwnedEventId>> = HashMap::new();
// Resolve the current state and add it to the state_at_event map then continue
// on in "time"
// Resolve the current state and add it to the state_at_event map then
// continue on in "time"
for node in super::lexicographical_topological_sort(&graph, &|_id| async {
Ok((int!(0), MilliSecondsSinceUnixEpoch(uint!(0))))
})
@@ -172,8 +172,9 @@ pub(crate) async fn do_check(
}
}
// TODO The event is just remade, adding the auth_events and prev_events here
// the `to_pdu_event` was split into `init` and the fn below, could be better
// TODO The event is just remade, adding the auth_events and prev_events
// here the `to_pdu_event` was split into `init` and the fn below,
// could be better
let e = fake_event;
let ev_id = e.event_id();
let event = to_pdu_event(
+2 -2
View File
@@ -45,8 +45,8 @@ impl Module {
.as_ref()
.expect("backing library loaded by this instance");
// SAFETY: Calls dlsym(3) on unix platforms. This might not have to be unsafe
// if wrapped in libloading with_dlerror().
// SAFETY: Calls dlsym(3) on unix platforms. This might not have to be
// unsafe if wrapped in libloading with_dlerror().
let sym = unsafe { handle.get::<Prototype>(cname.as_bytes()) };
let sym = sym.expect("symbol found; binding successful");
+2 -2
View File
@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ pub fn from_name(name: &str) -> Result<Library> {
}
pub fn from_path(path: &OsStr) -> Result<Library> {
//SAFETY: Calls dlopen(3) on unix platforms. This might not have to be unsafe
// if wrapped in with_dlerror.
//SAFETY: Calls dlopen(3) on unix platforms. This might not have to be
// unsafe if wrapped in with_dlerror.
let lib = unsafe { Library::open(Some(path), OPEN_FLAGS) };
if let Err(e) = lib {
let name = path::to_name(path)?;
+2 -2
View File
@@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ impl fmt::Display for Escape<'_> {
fmt.write_str(&pile_o_bits[last..i])?;
fmt.write_str(s)?;
// NOTE: we only expect single byte characters here - which is fine as long as
// we only match single byte characters
// NOTE: we only expect single byte characters here - which is fine
// as long as we only match single byte characters
last = i.saturating_add(1);
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -32,8 +32,8 @@ impl<'a> From<&'a str> for &'a Unquoted {
fn from(s: &'a str) -> &'a Unquoted {
let s: &'a str = s.unquote_infallible();
//SAFETY: This is a pattern I lifted from ruma-identifiers for strong-type strs
// by wrapping in a tuple-struct.
//SAFETY: This is a pattern I lifted from ruma-identifiers for
// strong-type strs by wrapping in a tuple-struct.
#[allow(clippy::transmute_ptr_to_ptr)]
unsafe {
std::mem::transmute(s)
+5 -4
View File
@@ -120,10 +120,11 @@ pub fn cores_available() -> impl Iterator<Item = Id> { from_mask(*CORES_AVAILABL
pub fn getcpu() -> Result<usize> {
use crate::{Error, utils::math};
// SAFETY: This is part of an interface with many low-level calls taking many
// raw params, but it's unclear why this specific call is unsafe. Nevertheless
// the value obtained here is semantically unsafe because it can change on the
// instruction boundary trailing its own acquisition and also any other time.
// SAFETY: This is part of an interface with many low-level calls taking
// many raw params, but it's unclear why this specific call is unsafe.
// Nevertheless the value obtained here is semantically unsafe because it
// can change on the instruction boundary trailing its own acquisition and
// also any other time.
let ret: i32 = unsafe { libc::sched_getcpu() };
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]